In 2000, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme throughout the country. The programme aimed at countering citizen’s exploitation and marginalisation – a principal driver of the 1994 genocide – through broad-based participation in local development planning. This article analyses the extent to which Rwanda’s evolving decentralisation process is meeting this aim. Tracking a shift in emphasis from local political participation to economic growth, it argues that increased technocratisation and centralised control combined with poor policy responsiveness and low levels of local government legitimacy are undermining post-conflict reconstruction.

Sierra Leone is widely cited as a positive example of the contribution that decentralisation can play in post-conflict reconstruction. This article critically examines this viewpoint from a political economy perspective as applied to an understanding of donor-driven institutional reform as well as the nature of hybridity and its impact on the sustainability of decentralisation processes. It examines the devolution of functions, finance, political and administrative powers, as well as its impact on three aspects of human development – primary health, basic education and rural water supply. The article concludes that external pressure can indeed ‘lock-in’ reforms but that a more nuanced, iterative and locally contextualised approach based on sound political economy analysis is needed in order to foster and sustain reform gains.

In November 2016, the Colombian Government and the insurgent FARC signed a final peace agreement. Central to the accord is what the parties call ‘territorial peacebuilding’, a long-term strategy to integrate Colombia’s vast (rural) hinterlands into the nation’s legal political system and economy. ‘Territorial peacebuilding’ follows on from decentralisation and security consolidation, both of which experienced problems, however, ultimately falling short of integrating Colombia. To be more effective now it is imperative to devise a governance strategy for territorial peacebuilding that includes the subnational political and administrative entities, enhances citizen participation and protects local governments from capture by criminal interests.

This article takes stock of Rwanda’s decentralisation by reviewing the existing evidence and putting it into perspective with the wider literature on decentralisation. It challenges the narrative that depicts the Rwandan decentralisation as a wholly negative or destabilising process by arguing that the focus of the scholarship on lack of popular participation should not ignore key dynamics that had significant stabilising effects. Yet, as the Rwandan economy and society are becoming more diversified, introduction of bottom-up mechanisms of decision-making will be necessary in the future to enhance the government responsiveness to evolving local needs and ensure stability in the long run.

It is often claimed that decentralisation is effective for the reduction of poverty due to inherent opportunities for higher popular participation and increased efficiency in public service delivery. This paper is a qualitative assessment of the potential of the Ugandan decentralisation reform for poverty alleviation. The Ugandan government initiated an ambitious decentralisation reform in 1992, which represents an example of full-fledged devolution with the transfer of far-reaching responsibilities to local governments. However, several shortcomings, such as low levels of accountability, insufficient human and financial resources, corruption, patronage, and central resistance to decentralisation, constrain the proper implementation of the reform, putting improvements in participation and efficiency at risk and ultimately jeopardising the intended impact on poverty.