Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.

This research examined the challenges, enablers and outcomes of organisation transformation in Philippine local governments. We combined a multi-case study research design and backward mapping approach in collecting and analysing narratives from 55 leaders in 9 Filipino local government units (LGUs) that have successfully undergone transformation. Results show that the transformations of the LGUs appear to have been catalysed by three interrelated elements: vision, LGU leadership and citizen engagement. The transformation in the local governments concentrated on multiple foci of reform including structure and systems improvement, culture change, human-resource development as well as policy and programme development. This holistic approach enabled the transformation of bureaucratic and unprofessional government service to transparent, professional and efficient public service that engendered pride, transparency and social equity. Implications of the proposed model for transforming LGUs and in developing LGU leaders for good governance are discussed.

Keeping the best interests of children in mind, this paper examines the prevailing restorative model of justice at local government level of Bangladesh and argues that this model, if adequately activated and reformed, can be a desirable alternative to the formal system of justice for children who come into contact or conflict with the law. In doing so, the paper outlines the historical development of local government adjudication mechanisms, analyzes the existing norms and procedure of such adjudication, outlines the potential of such adjudication bodies as viable alternatives to juvenile courts in protecting the best interests of children, sets out the shortcomings of the local government bodies and the challenges involved in capturing their potential, and finally suggests a number of ways in which the model could be improved.

This commentary reviews contemporary changes in aid modalities and their impact on processes of decentralization. The main change in aid delivery and disbursement considered is towards a greater emphasis on general budget support (GBS) and sector wide approaches (SWAPs). This includes considering the broad questions of firstly, the impact of emphasising GBS on local government and governance systems, and secondly, the extent to which processes of decentralization can fit in with this new approach.

Local government in Malaysia occupies the third and lowest level after federal and state governments. Under the Malaysian federal constitution (paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Ninth Schedule), local government is the responsibility of the states, but the federal government also exercises considerable power and influence over local government, especially in peninsular Malaysia. The dynamic of the Malaysian federal system is such that it has shifted the balance of power to the centre.Local government accounts for only 1% of GDP. There are 144 local authorities divided into cities (major administrative and commercial centres), municipalities (other urban areas), and districts (chiefly rural areas). Executive powers rest with the Mayor (cities) or President, supported and/or overseen by a system of committees. Currently, local councils in Malaysia are not elected: councillors are appointed by the state government for 3-year terms (with the option of re-appointment) and in most cases come from the ruling coalition.